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One of the predominant causes of fires in 
underground coal mines is flame cutting and welding.  
These fires can lead to major events such as the 
explosion that occurred on January 22, 2003 in an 
airshaft being constructed at the McElroy mine.  Six 
contractors were inside the shaft at the time of the 
explosion and the explosion fatally injured three and 
seriously injured three [MSHA 2003].  Understanding 
the root causes of these fires and explosions will help 
prevent these types of events from occurring in the 
future.  Fires and explosions require fuel, oxygen and an 
ignition source (heat).  These three items are referred to 
as a fire triangle.  The control of these three items in 
flame cutting and welding operations is required to 
prevent fires and or explosions.  United States 
Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) Reports of Investigation (ROI), 
MSHA Mine Accident, Injury, and Illness Reports, and 
the MSHA Mining Industry Accident, Injuries 
Employment, and Production Data Base were analyzed 
and interviews and observations with mine workers and 
welders were conducted to determine the root causes of 
coal mine fires and explosions caused by flame cutting 
and welding operations.  This paper will discuss the root 
causes and potential means to reduce the number of fires 
and resulting fatalities and injuries caused by or due to 




One of the goals of NIOSH is to enhance the safety 
of mine workers by preventing disasters caused by fires 
and explosions.  To prevent and reduce the number of 
fires and explosions from occurring in underground coal 
mines, one must understand the nature of their initiation 
and identify the root causes.  Small underground coal 
mine fires can lead to larger uncontrolled fires if not 
extinguished quickly.   
Of the four major sources of fires in underground 
coal mines (electrical, friction, flame cutting and 
welding, and spontaneous combustion), flame cutting 
and welding operations are probably the easiest to 
manage.  There is always a person present who can 
ensure that the heat source is used only when the fuel can 
be controlled and accidental ignitions can be 
extinguished immediately.  Fires related to flame cutting 
and welding are normally a result of human failure to 
prepare and protect the work site [Hartman et al. 1997].     
Major fires and explosions have been reduced over 
the last few decades at coal mines in the United States.  
With respect to flame cutting and welding fires, Pomroy 
and Carigiet reported that 16% of the 164 underground 
coal mine fires from 1978 – 1992 were caused from 
flame cutting and welding operations [Pomroy et al 
1992].  Conti reported that 14% of the 76 underground 
coal mine fires from 1991-2000 were caused from flame 
cutting and welding operations [Conti et al. 2005].  Even 
though there has been a slight reduction in flame cutting 
and welding fires, over the last few decades, 14% is still 
too high and the goal is to have zero fires and explosions.   
Any fire or explosion in an underground coal mine is 
a potential disaster.  Underground coal mines are 
confined in space and the ventilation system is required 
to provide a constant supply of breathable air and dilute 
and renders harmless any explosive or toxic gas and 
dusts.  The ventilation system can play a major part in 
the occurrence of fires and explosions and in their 
prevention, since it can carry combustion products, hot 
smoke particles, or provide dilution of the explosive 
gasses in confined spaces.  After an underground coal 
mine fire or explosion occurs, the mine air composition 
and ventilation flow quantities may change.  It is difficult 
to predict the direction and quantity of airflow in areas 
with active fires or where ventilation controls have been 
destroyed.   
 
 
Methodologies for Determining 
Root Causes 
 
The root causes of mine fires and explosions caused 
by flame cutting and welding fires were determined by 
analyzing MSHA Reports of Investigation [MSHA 2003, 
MSHA 1992, MSHA 1999] from three recent major 
accidents, MSHA Mine Accident, Injury, and Illness 
Reports from 1995 to 2005, the MSHA Mining Industry 
Accident, Injuries Employment, and Production Data 
Base [MSHA 2006], and by conducting interviews with 
mine workers and welders and through observations of 
flame cutting.   
 
MSHA Reports of Investigation 
A formal Report of Investigation is required for all 
fatal accidents.  MSHA District Managers determine if 
Reports of Investigation will be filed for other non-fatal 
or non-injury investigations based on factors such as the 
need to inform the industry of case-specific facts or 
public interest.   
 
MSHA Accident, Injury and Illness 
Reports 
Mine operators are required by 30 CFR §50.10 to 
immediately contact MSHA when an accident occurs.  
After notification of an accident by the mine operator, 
the MSHA District Manager will decide whether to 
conduct an accident investigation and will promptly 
inform the operator of his or her decision.  If MSHA 
decides to investigate an accident, it will initiate the 
investigation within 24 hours of notification.  Accidents 
pertaining to flame cutting and welding include: an 
unplanned ignition or explosion of gas or dust, an 
unplanned mine fire which is not extinguished within 15 
minutes of discovery, and an injury or death due to flame 
cutting or welding operation.  
In addition to immediately reporting accidents, 
30 CFR §50.20 requires mine operators to prepare and 
submit a Mine Accident, Injury, and Illness Report, 
MSHA Form 7000-1, for each accident, occupational 
injury, or occupational illness at the mine.  An 
occupational injury is any injury to a miner which occurs 
at a mine and for which medical treatment is 
administered, or which results in death or loss of 
consciousness, inability to perform all job duties on any 
day after an injury, temporary assignment to other duties, 
or transfer to another job.  Occupational illness means an 
illness or disease of a miner which may have resulted 
from work at a mine or for which an award of 
compensation is made [CFR]. 
When MSHA investigates an accident, Accident 
Investigation Data Forms, MSHA Form 7000-50 series, 
are completed by MSHA inspectors to document their 
findings.  These forms are entirely independent from 
MSHA Form 7000-1; however both sets of forms can be 
on record with MSHA if MSHA had performed an 
investigation.  
 
MSHA Mining Industry Accident Injuries 
Employment and Production Data Base 
NIOSH’s Surveillance and Statistics team accessed 
MSHA Mining Industry Accident, Injuries Employment, 
and Production public data base from 1995-2005 to 
identify injuries that were caused by flame cutting and 
welding of underground mine fires and explosions.  The 
information in this data base is entered from MSHA 
Form 7000-1 reports filed by mine operators. 
 
 
Analysis of Flame Cutting and 
Welding Fires and Explosions 
 
McElroy Mine Explosion 
An explosion occurred on January 22, 2003 at the 
McElroy Mine (WV) at a shaft sinking site where 
contractors were attempting to remove corrugated, 
galvanized steel sheeting which was blocking access to 
the unventilated water ring being constructed.  Three of 
the workers were fatally injured and three were seriously 
injured.  The workers first cut an opening in the sheeting 
with an axe.  This opening was large enough to allow the 
foreman to place a hand-held methane detector in the 
opening to test for methane gas.  The reading obtained 
was 0.2%.  After the methane reading, a mechanic 
starting cutting the sheeting with an oxygen-acetylene 
torch and an explosion occurred inside the water ring 
that had contained an explosive methane-air mixture. 
MSHA determined that the root cause of the 
explosion at the McElroy mine was that the examination 
for methane was not adequate.  An adequate examination 
would have required testing for methane in all areas that 
could have been affected by the used of cutting torch 
[MSHA 2003].  
 
Blackville Mine Explosion 
An explosion due to a welding operation occurred on 
March 19, 1992 at the Blackville No. 1 Mine, (WV) 
under the cap above the Production shaft, which resulted 
in the deaths of four persons (one mine employee and 
three contractors).  The personnel underground were not 
injured by the effect of the explosion and safely exited 
the mine.  Overcasts, cribs, stoppings, and the rotary 
dump in the underground area within 100 feet of the 
shaft were also severely damaged by the forces of the 
explosion.   
 
According to MSHA, the causes of the explosion at 
the Blacksville No.1 Mine were as follows [MSHA 
1992]:  
1) The volume and velocity of air was not 
maintained in sufficient amounts to render 
harmless and to carry away explosive gases. 
2) The approved ventilation system and methane 
and dust control plan for this mine was not 
followed in that a major change in ventilation 
was made without the approval of MSHA.  A 
major ventilation change occurred when the 
production shaft was capped. 
3) A change in ventilation was made which 
affected the split of air ventilating the 
Production shaft.  A few miners continued to 
work underground.  Miners were allowed to 
work in this environment before a certified 
person checked the changes in ventilation.  
Methane was being liberated inside the shaft 
and failure to adequately ventilate the area 
allowed an explosive methane-air mixture to 
accumulate undetected in the production shaft 
that was being capped.   
4) Methane examinations were not being 
conducted at the capped Production shaft.  
Welding operations were conducted without 
examinations for methane having been made at 
any time.  
 
Loveridge Mine Fire  
An underground coal mine fire was discovered at 
12:50 a.m. on June 22, 1999 inside the Loveridge No. 22 
Mine, near and behind a permanent stopping separating 
the submains from a mined-out longwall pillared area.  
According to MSHA, a foreman found the fire while 
checking on a work site where flame cutting operations 
had been performed on the previous day shift.  The 
foreman traveled to another section of the mine to obtain 
fire-fighting equipment and to report the fire.  Four other 
foremen, including the shift foreman, joined him and 
attempted to put out the fire with three 20-pound fire 
extinguishers at the base of the permanent stopping but 
were not successful.  Water was sprayed onto the 
stopping and an orange glow was still visible through 
holes in the bottom and both top corners of the stopping.  
The shift foreman then realized that there was a large fire 
on the inby side of the stopping, within the worked-out 
area, and sent one of the foreman to a nearby mine phone 
to inform all underground personnel to report to fight the 
fire.  Seven additional mine workers who were 
underground at the time assisted in fighting the fire.  
Water was applied to the fire through the holes in the 
stopping; however, the conditions of the fire worsened 
and the mine was evacuated at 1:45 a.m.  Management 
made the decision to seal the entire mine in order to 
minimize the spread of the fire.   
According to MSHA, the cause of the mine fire at 
the Loveridge No. 22 mine was the failure to comply 
with 30 CFR §75.1106 (A diligent search for fire was not 
made during and after flame cutting operations, which 
were performed during the day shift) [MSHA 1999]. 
 
MSHA Mine Accident Analysis 
MSHA investigation reports from 1995 – 2005 were 
examined in order to determine the root causes of fires 
and explosions caused by flame cutting and welding 
operations in underground U.S. coal mines during this 
time period.  From the MSHA 7000-50 reports, thirty-
one fires or explosions were the result from flame cutting 




From the MSHA accident reports, the three causes of 
these fires or explosions, shown in Figure 2, were:  
1) Hot slag or sparks ignited methane bleeders on 
the roof, ribs or floor (28 fires or explosions).  
2) Hot slag or sparks ignited a methane build up 
(for example, in an air shaft or under a 
longwall pan) (9 fires or explosions). 
3) Hot slag or sparks ignited coal dust on the 





According to MSHA, 12 citations were issued for 
violations of safety standards that contributed to these 
accidents.  These enforcement actions were issued under 
six different subparts of 30 CFR Part 75-Mandatory 
Safety Standards-Underground Coal Mines and 30 CFR 
Part 77-Mandatory Safety Standards, Surface Coal 
Mines and Surface Work Areas of Underground Coal 
Mines.  Figure 3 shows the failures that contributed to 
these accidents, including: 
1) Six citations for inadequate examination of 
methane. 
2) Two citations for ventilation plan not followed. 
3) One citation for inadequate search for fire. 
4) One citation for inadequate rock dusting. 
5) One citation for unusable fire extinguisher.  





Mining Industry Accident, Injuries, 
Employment and Production Data Base 
Analysis 
Another problem with flame cutting and welding 
operations is personal injuries.  The mining industry 
accident, injuries, employment, and production data base 
was examined from 1995-2005 to identify the number of 
personal injuries from flame cutting or welding activities 
[MSHA 2006].  From this data there were a total of 
thirty-three nonfatal injuries caused by flame cutting or 
welding (Figure 4).   
 
 
The numbers and causes of these injuries, shown in 
Figure 5 were:    
1) 19 injuries resulted from sparks or hot slag.   
• Eleven of these injuries occurred 
when the mine worker was cutting in 
a position where hot sparks were 
able to fall into the worker’s ear.  For 
example, one of the mine workers 
was lying on their side next to a 
continuous miner, one under a cable 
tray, one was under a roller bearing 
on a conveyor system, and another 
was under a continuous miner 
cutting head cutting off bit lugs when 
hot sparks entered the mine worker’s 
ear.  
• Five of these injuries occurred when 
the mine worker was cutting or 
welding and hot slag or a spark got 
behind the welding shield or cutting 
glasses. 
• Three of these injuries occurred 
when the mine worker was cutting 
and sparks or hot slag entered 
through openings in the shirt, gloves 
or boots.  In one of these injuries, the 
mine worker was stretching to cut a 
top rail and a spark went down his 
shirt and burned him.  In another 
injury, the mine worker was burning 
lugs off of a continuous miner when 
hot slag entered his boot.  In the last 
injury, the mine worker was cutting a 
swivel pin out of a continuous miner 
when a piece of hot slag burned the 
oxygen hose behind the torch.  The 
hose then caught fire burning the 
mine worker’s hand.    
2) Four injuries resulted from faulty or damaged 
torch hoses. 
• One set of welding hoses broke and 
caught fire burning the mine 
worker’s left hand. 
• One set of hoses was cut when roof 
rock fell onto both the oxygen and 
acetylene hoses.  The mine worker’s 
left glove filled with the gases which 
were ignited by a spark, burning the 
worker’s hand. 
• One set of hoses was damaged when 
a beltline headroller was being 
disassembled with a cutting torch.  A 
piece of metal fell on the hoses, 
pulling the hoses away from the 
mine worker.  The mine worker then 
examined the hoses without shutting 
off the torch.  The hoses were 
damaged and leaking, causing them 
to catch fire and burn the mine 
worker’s left finger and thumb.   
   
• One set of hoses got caught in a 
feeder breaker when a mine worker 
was using a torch to change a 
bearing on the tail roller.  The torch 
hoses got caught in the breaker 
which pulled the small acetylene 
tank through breaker, causing it to 
explode and burning the mine 
worker. 
3) Four injuries resulted from the improper 
handling of the torch. 
• One injury resulted when the mine 
worker was using a cutting torch to 
trim a piece of belt structure and 
caught his glove on fire.   
• One injury resulted when the mine 
worker completed cutting with a 
torch and then shut it off.  The 
worker then used the torch to blow 
dust off of his safety glasses, which 
were hanging around his neck.  The 
worker lost his balance and the hot 
torch touched his right eye burning 
his cornea.   
• One injury resulted when the mine 
worker used a cutting torch on a 
piece of metal lodged and under 
tension at the bottom of the feeder.  
When the hot metal suddenly 
released from under tension, it struck 
his arm and burned it. 
• One injury resulted when the mine 
worker’s cutting torch went out due 
to the accumulation of debris at the 
end of the cutting torch tip.  The 
mine worker shut off the torch, and 
used his left, glove-covered hand to 
clean the torch tip.  The glove caught 
on fire and burned his left hand.    
4) Three injuries resulted from methane gas 
ignitions. 
• Two injuries resulted when two mine 
workers were using cutting torches 
to a cut a longwall conveyor chain 
and a methane ignition occurred.  An 
accumulation of methane gas under 
the conveyor ignited, burning both 
workers.   
• One injury resulted when the mine 
worker was flame cutting near the 
face inside a vertical shaft.  The 
ventilation device, intended to 
ventilate the area in which the 
ignition occurred, was not within the 
20-foot maximum distance required 
by the shaft sinking plan, allowing 
methane gas to accumulate in a roof 
void approximately thirty-four feet 
from the end of the ventilation 
tubing.  One miner was burned. 
5) One injury resulted from a leaky pressure 
gauge on an acetylene tank.  The mine worker 
was flame cutting a conveyor chain on a 
continuous miner.  Hot slag ignited the leak 
near the acetylene tank pressure gauge, 
burning the mine worker’s face.   
6) One injury resulted while the mine worker was 
flame cutting bolts from the center section of a 
scoop.  Hot sparks caught lubricating grease on 
fire.  The mine worker extinguished the grease 
fire with his left gloved-cover hand.  The mine 
work burned his left hand. 
7) One injury occurred while the mine worker 
was welding a toolbox latch.  Oil located 





The effects of these fires resulted in 11 burned ears, 11 
burned hands, five burned eyes, four burned faces, one 





Mine Worker Interviews 
 
Several miners who perform flame cutting and 
welding operations were interviewed by NIOSH’s 
researchers to gain insight into the root causes of fires 
caused by flame cutting and welding.  One mine worker 
stated that taking adequate time to preparing and perform 
flame cutting and welding tasks was very important in 
preventing accidents and injuries.  Some examples he 
gave on how to perform the flame cutting or welding job 
safely were: check the oxygen and acetylene tanks, 
gauges and hoses for leaks or damage, rock dust the area, 
have portable fire extinguishers in close proximity, and 
perform an adequate methane check.  Another mine 
worker commented that having a helper or observer 
could prevent accidents and injuries.  Working alone 
makes it difficult to detect hot spots from sparks and 
slag.  Another mine worker stated that methane pockets 
from bleeders on the floor of the mine often accumulate 
under equipment, especially under longwall panlines.  
These methane pockets are difficult to detect with hand-
held methane detectors and can result in fires or 
explosions when flame cutting or welding.  The mine 
worker also stated that he had observed several small 
fires from flame cutting that were initiated while cutting 
off rusted bolts when relocating the conveyor systems.  
The mine workers all felt strongly that these small fires 
had the potential to lead to major fires or explosions.  
 
 
Flame Cutting Experiments 
 
Several flame cutting experiments were performed 
by an experienced miner at NIOSH’s Lake Lynn 
Laboratory to observe the effects of hot steel particles on 
coal fines and grease.  Coal fines and grease were placed 
on a steel sheet (1/8 in. x 2 ft. x 2 ft.) and the miner 
performed a flame cutting operation directly above 
(Figure 7).   
This allowed sparks and slag to fall onto the coal fines 
and grease.  Thermal images of the coal fines and grease 
were taken using an infrared (IR) camera.  Figure 8 
shows an image from the IR camera of the sparks and 
slag from the flame cutting operation falling onto the 
coal and grease.  In this image, hot spots of 1600 ºF were 
observed.
  
Hot particles and slag from the flame cutting that came 
in contact with the coal fines and grease immediately 
ignited the grease.  After several minutes, the flames 
from the grease appeared to be burned out and, to the 
naked eye, the fire appeared to be out; however, hot 
spots not visible by the human eye were detected by the 
IR camera.  The highest temperatures observed with the 
IR camera approximately 15 minutes, after the end of the 
cutting operations, were between 200-300˚F degrees 
(Figure 9).  These hot spots were monitored with the IR 
camera for a time period of approximately two hours and 





A small fan with an average air velocity of 400 
ft/min was then placed one foot in front of steel sheet 
that contained the coal fines and grease.  This ventilation 
flow caused the temperature of the hot spots to increase, 
resulting in a re-ignition of the coal fines and grease.  
Without the use of the IR camera, it appeared that the 
fire was completely extinguished.  This demonstrates 
that hot spots, hot enough to re-ignite coal and grease, 







Root Causes of Fires and 
Explosions 
 
From the MSHA Mine Accident reports that were 
analyzed, the major cause of fires and explosions due to 
flame cutting and welding was an inadequate 
examination for methane.  While 30 CFR §75.323(a) 
specifies that tests for methane concentrations must be 
made at least 12 inches from the roof, face, ribs and 
floor, this distance requirement is not applicable to 
welding, cutting and soldering activities performed under 
§75.1106.  MSHA’s policy on §75.1106 clearly states 
that methane tests conducted under this section must be 
made in locations where methane is likely to exist, and in 
no case is cutting, welding or soldering permitted in an 
atmosphere that contains 1.0 percent or more of methane.  
Since the face, roof, ribs, floors and any fully or partially 
enclosed areas of an underground coal mine are locations 
where methane is likely to exist, methane tests must also 
be made at or near the surface of these areas (not 12 
inches away), and within any enclosed areas that may be 
exposed to the above ignition sources MSHA [2004].  
According to MSHA, additional ventilation may also be 
used to reduce the methane level in these areas where 
flame cutting and welding activities are occurring.   
The root causes of mine workers not conducting 
adequate methane examinations include: 
 
1) Methane checks are not being made close 
enough to surfaces where ignitable 
concentrations of methane may exist.  Tests 
should be conducted in and around the 
immediate area where flame cutting and 
welding is conducted and where hot slag and 
sparks might fly.  If necessary, a pump type 
methane monitor and probe should be used 




2) The methane checks are not being performed 
throughout the entire area where hot sparks or 
slag may reach.   
3) Improper use of methane detection 
instrumentation.  When continuously 
monitoring for methane, the instrument needs 
to be located where the highest concentration 
of methane is likely to first accumulate within 
the area affected by the flame cutting or 
welding task. 
 
From the MSHA Mine Injury reports that were 
analyzed, the other causes of accidents were as follows: 
 
1) Unsafe acts such as not using appropriate 
personal protection equipment or using flame 
cutting and welding equipment in an unsafe 
manner. 
2) The environment or physical workspace was 
not properly prepared, resulting in physical 
hazards remaining in the workspace. 
3) Inspection of tools and equipment was not 
done prior to starting the task.  
4) A diligent search for fire and hot spots in all 
potentially affected areas was not made during 
and after cutting operations. 
 
In the author’s opinion, the root causes of these 
accidents were as follows: 
 
1) The area was not properly prepared.  For 
example: adequate ventilation needs to be 
provided, methane checks need to be 
performed around the entire area prior and 
during the task, grease needs to be cleaned off 
of surface area prior to starting flame cutting 
and welding and a portable fire extinguisher 
should be located in close proximity of the 
work area.   
2) Tools and equipment were not inspected prior 
to starting the task.  A safety check of the tools 
and equipment must be performed prior to the 
start of each flame cutting or welding task.  
3) The personal protection equipment must be 
chosen so that it is effective and also 
comfortable to wear.   
4) If a search for fire was performed after the 
flame cutting or welding work ended and no 
hot spots were detected, it is possible that hot 
spots may have been invisible to the human 





Based on the data obtained, there are several 
recommendations for reducing the number of fire 
accidents and injuries caused by flame cutting or welding 
by addressing the root causes identified above.  
  
1) The inspection doors on longwall panlines 
should be removed when available to allow 
methane pockets to be vented.  
2) All persons (mine workers and contractors) 
who are required to conduct methane 
examinations during flame cutting and welding 
operations should have regular training. This 
training should include:  
• The proper calibration and use of 
methane detection instruments.   
• Proper methods for tests of methane 
and the use of methane probes in 
conjunction with a methane pump.   
3) All persons (mine workers and contractors) 
who are required to flame cut or weld should 
have regular training.  This training should 
include:  
• A review of pertinent regulations 
pertaining to flame cutting and 
welding in underground coal mines.  
Some of these include:  
o Welding, cutting or 
soldering must be done 
under the supervision of a 
qualified person.   
o The qualified person must 
conduct a diligent search 
for fire during and after 
any welding, cutting, or 
soldering activity.   
o Any welding, cutting or 
soldering shall not be 
conducted in air that 
contains 1.0 percent or 
more methane.  
o Rock dust (240 pounds) or 
one portable fire 
extinguisher shall be 
immediately available 
during any welding, 
cutting or soldering 
activity.   
o A diligent search for hot 
sports shall be made after 
flame cutting or welding.  
Hot spots can remain 
invisible and smolder for 
many hours.   
• Proper preparation of the area and 
good house keeping.  Its appears that 
better fire protection to the work area 
around conveyor structures is needed 
when performing flame cutting or 
welding on these structures, since 
several small fires have resulted 
while relocating these structures. 
• Proper use of a torch.  All persons 
required to use a torch should have 
regular training on torch operation 
and safety.  
4) When the flame cutting or welding tasks are 
completed, additional rock dusting and water 
should be used in all areas where the task was 
performed in order to extinguish any remaining 
hot spots. 
5) The oncoming shift section foreman should 
make an immediate inspection of the area 
where flame cutting or welding operations 
were performed and record that a check for fire 
and hot spots was made.   
6) The proper use of personal protection 
equipment will help reduce the number of 
accidents and injuries.  PPE that should be 
worn in areas of flame cutting or welding 
includes:  
• Flame-resistant gloves 
• Safety cutting goggles when flame 
cutting 
• Welder’s helmets with full face 
shield when welding 
• Flame-resistant hood  
• Welder’s apron 
• Metatarsal boots 
• Long-sleeved shirts and full length 
pants made from heavy, flame-
resistant material. 
Based on the number of injuries to the ears and 
eyes, it appears that an ergonomically 
designed, custom-fit ear guard made from a 
fire-resistant material, and an ergonomically 
designed custom-fit welding shield and cutting 
glasses could reduce the number of injuries to 
these body parts.  
7) Hoses must be routed such that they are 
protected from machinery, roof falls and sharp 
objects.    
8) The use of thermal imaging (IR) systems to 
detect hot spots.  In addition, there are several 
other uses for IR systems in an underground 
coal mine that can reduce the risks of accidents 
fatalities and injuries.  These include: 
inspection of hot rollers during belt exams, 
power center inspections, brake inspections, 
hot hangers inspections on trolley wires, and 
mine rescue efforts. 
9) New technologies are also being developed 
using IR for detecting methane gas emissions.  
NIOSH PRL has begun researching this 
technology at its ventilation gallery to evaluate 
its effectiveness for use in underground coal 
mines.  In addition, this technology may be 
used on the surface in coal preparation plants 
and at gob vent holes.  Manufacturers are 
considering developing intrinsically safe IR 
instruments for use in underground coal mines 





Flame cutting and welding fires have accounted for 
approximately 15% of the reportable underground coal 
mine fires over the last 25 year period.  These fires have 
led to major events such as the McElroy mine explosion 
on January 22, 2003, the Loveridge No. 22 mine fire on 
June 22, 1999, and the Blackville No. 1 mine explosion 
on March 19, 1992.  One of the goals of NIOSH is to 
enhance the safety of mine workers by preventing 
disasters caused by fires and explosions.  This paper 
identifies some of the root causes of fires and explosions 
and causes of injuries resulting from flame cutting and 
welding.  These include the failure to detect hot spots 
(sometimes invisible to the human eye), inadequate 
methane checks of the entire area where hot sparks or 
slag can reach, failure to adequately prepare the work 
site and the improper use of personal protective 
equipment. Suggestions to correct these root cause 
failures include training in the use of methane measuring 
instrumentation and personal protective equipment and 
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